Crisis knowledge in tourism: types, flows and governance by Paraskevas, A et al.
 RADAR 





Paraskevas, A, Altinay, L, McLean, J and Cooper, C 
 
Crisis knowledge in tourism: types, flows and governance. 
 
Annals of Tourism Research, 2013, 41 (April). pp. 130-152.  
10.1016/j.annals.2012.12.005  
This version is available: http://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/items/bb97ccb8-84b6-234d-741a-c4099bcee28b/1/ 
Available on RADAR: July 2013 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for 
personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted 
extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed 
in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s final version of the journal article. Some differences between the published version and this 
version may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from it.  
 
WWW.BROOKES.AC.UK/GO/RADAR 
Crisis Knowledge in Tourism: Types, Flows and Governance 
 
 
PLEASE CITE AS: 
 
Paraskevas, A., Altinay, L., McLean, J. and Cooper, C. (2013). Crisis 
Knowledge in Tourism: Types, Flows and Governance, Annals of Tourism 




Abstract: Driven by the rapidly growing number of crises that affect tourism, the study of 
crisis knowledge management is gaining an increased interest in the tourism field. Effective 
management of crisis knowledge enhances the resilience of tourism organizations and 
destinations in crisis situations, strengthens their defense mechanisms, limits potential 
damages and allows them to bounce back to normalcy faster. This paper uses critical incident 
interviews with 21 tourism executives in order to identify the types of crisis knowledge they 
employ in the advent of a crisis and to explore the crisis knowledge management processes 
and flows within their organizations. Drawing from extant generic literature and the 
informants' responses, the paper proposes a framework for the governance of crisis 
knowledge in tourism. 
 






The twenty first century business environment has entered a period of rapid and 
unexpected change, the like of which the corporate world has never witnessed before 
(Brinkley, 2008; Houghton & Sheehan, 2000). Hitt (1998, p. 299) suggests “we are on the 
precipice of an epoch” where knowledge, globalization, intense competition, environmental 
turbulence and uncertainty, rapid and ubiquitous change and both information and 
technological revolutions have carved a new competitive landscape (Barnes, 2002; 
Stonehouse & Pemberton, 1999). This knowledge economy era, or “the age of intellect” 
(Carroll & Tansey, 2000, p. 296) is an economy where knowledge is not only a key 
characteristic of post-industrial societies but also the critical resource “and driver of economic 
development and success for nations, companies and individuals alike” (Rylander, 2009, p. 
1).  
 
The survival of organizations is no longer dependent upon their tangible resources but 
rather in the management of intangible knowledge capital. Klein (2008) argues that in this 
new economy the only sustainable advantage is what an organization knows, how it can 
utilize what it knows and how fast it can learn something new. Weick (2001) goes further by 
stating that the way knowledge is managed within an organization is key to its resilience, i.e., 
its ability to withstand turbulence and bounce back from stresses and disruptions but also to 
develop new capabilities and even create new opportunities in light of adversity. He proposes 
an ‘attitude to wisdom’ and suggests that to be wise is not to know particular facts but to 
know without excessive confidence or excessive cautiousness. An investigation of the Global 
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Financial Crisis illustrates where the lack of such ‘attitude to wisdom’, overconfidence and 
‘superior’ or ‘imperfect’ knowledge can lead organizations and, in effect, the global 
socioeconomic system (Clark, 2011).  
 
The value of knowledge and the importance of knowledge management have also been 
acknowledged in the tourism management literature. For tourism organizations operating in a 
period of organizational adaptation, discontinuous change, more frequent crises and the need 
to be competitive, knowledge management provides a useful conceptual framework and set of 
approaches (Cooper, 2006). The generation and exploitation of knowledge is viewed as 
critical for the innovation and development of new tourism products (Hjalager, 2002; 
Weidenfeld, Williams & Butler, 2010); for the effective management of hotels (Bouncken & 
Sungsoo, 2002); for tourism destination management (Xiao & Smith, 2007); to understand 
how networks of tourism organizations interact to produce tourism services (Cooper, Baggio, 
& Scott, 2010) and also for effective tourism crisis management (Blackman, Kennedy & 
Ritchie, 2011). 
 
In an environment, however, where the tourism industry is increasingly exposed to 
disruptions, stresses and crises, tourism academics have developed and presented a number of 
valuable frameworks for the management of disasters (Faulkner, 2001; Hystad & Keller, 
2008; Paraskevas & Arendell, 2007; Ritchie 2004) although more emphasis was put on 
destination image recovery and recovery marketing (Armstrong & Ritchie, 2008; Beirman, 
2003; Fall & Massey, 2006; Santana, 2004). Surprisingly, in an era when the industry is 
facing a series of prolonged crises such as climate change, global recession, widespread 
political instability, etc. with highly complex impacts and is in need of a framework for the 
development and governance of crisis knowledge, only few attempts were made by academics 
to explore the knowledge aspects of crises and disasters (Anderson, 2006; Blackman & 
Ritchie, 2008; Blackman et al., 2011; Mistilis & Sheldon, 2006).  
 
The present paper aims at narrowing this gap in the extant literature by identifying the 
types of crisis knowledge tourism organizations employ in the advent of a crisis and by 
exploring the crisis knowledge management processes and flows within these organizations. It 
also explores the ways that organizational factors such as leadership, structure, culture and 
communication influence these processes and flows.  
 
 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND CRISIS 
 
Polanyi (1966) argues that there are two types of knowledge: tacit and explicit. Tacit 
knowledge is "a non-linguistic, non-numerical form of knowledge that is highly personal and 
context specific and deeply rooted in individual experiences, ideas, values and emotions" 
(Gourlay, 2002, p. 2).  Gore and Gore (1999) suggest that tacit knowledge consists of two key 
components: technical tacit knowledge and cognitive tacit knowledge. First, technical tacit 
knowledge encapsulates information, expertise, knowledge and skills that are developed and 
utilized. Second, cognitive tacit knowledge encompasses implicit perceptions, beliefs, mental 
models and values so deeply ingrained in individuals that they become a natural part of what 
individuals are, think and do and, more often than not, is taken for granted (Ravetz, 1971). As 
tacit knowledge is acquired by an individual’s internalized processes (such as experience, 
talent and reflection) it cannot be taught, managed, speedily migrated or transposed to 




Explicit knowledge, or encoded knowledge (Blackler, 1995) is the knowledge that is 
made manifest through language, symbols, objects and artifacts (Choo, 1998). There are two 
types of explicit knowledge: a) object-based, which is manifest in the form of patents, 
technical drawings and blueprints, software code databases, statistical reports and business 
plans and b) rule-based, which is expressed as routines, rules and procedures (Choo, 1998).  
Elbanna (2008), McCall, Arnold and Sutton (2008) and Roberts (2000) advocate that explicit 
knowledge can be disseminated throughout the organization and be made available to large 
numbers of people more cost effectively than tacit knowledge. It is more manageable for 
organizations, insofar as it can be codified, stored in databases and retrieved and exploited on 
demand, aided by the support of fast and reliable information and communication 
technologies (Smith, 2001).   
 
Organizations can maximize the benefits of tacit and explicit knowledge if they manage 
both types in a systematic manner (Hansen, Nohria & Tierney, 1999). They, therefore, have to 
develop appropriate strategies to not only manage knowledge flows, but also manage 
knowledge per se (Jasimuddin, Klein, & Connell, 2005; Schulz & Jobe, 2001). Two such 
strategies are codification, which places an emphasis on both the collection and organization 
of knowledge; and personalization, which focuses on human resources and communication 
processes. Johnson and Lundvall (2001, p.4) define codification as "a process of transforming 
knowledge into a format that makes it possible for knowledge to be stored and transformed as 
information." In the case of a personalization strategy, "knowledge is closely tied to the 
person who developed it and is shared primarily through direct person-to-person contact." 
(Hansen et al., 1999, p.107). Both definitions emphasize that knowledge is shared by contact 
with others, through for example, communities of practice, brainstorming sessions, exchange 
of dialogue between individuals and teams or via storytelling. Edvarsson (2008) and 
Stonehouse and Pemberton (1999) state that organizations need to reconfigure their 
knowledge management structures, in order to ensure that the right knowledge gets to the 
right people at the right time.  
 
This is particularly relevant for organizations when a crisis occurs, as relevant 
knowledge needs to be identified and applied quickly to a particular situation.  However, there 
is little research that has explicitly linked knowledge and crisis management. In part this is 
because the ‘crisis management’ field is a relatively new area of research. Nonetheless, it has 
received significant attention, especially in the 1980s and the early 1990s when, according to 
Rasmussen and Batstone (1989), the frequency and magnitude of organizational crises, and 
the subsequent impacts, increased at an alarming rate. A series of crises and accidents such as 
Bhopal, Chernobyl, Challenger, Hillsborough, and Lockerbie attracted the interest of 
researchers from several disciplines resulting in the emergence of a rich, but relatively 
fragmented, literature.  
 
The main body of research concentrated more on crisis and post-crisis communication 
(Schultz & Seeger, 1991; Seeger, 1986; Sellnow, 1993), the interrelationships between both 
internal and external stakeholders (Kabak & Siomkos, 1990; Marcus & Goodman, 1991) and 
the social control of organizations (Bromiley & Marcus, 1989). Another stream of research 
proposed different models for the development of crises (Fink, 1986; Smith, 1990) and their 
management (Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992) by building 
on earlier work by Fink, Beak, and Taddeo (1971) and Turner (1976). Mitroff (1988), in 
particular, offered a more distinct framework, which distinguished five phases or 
“mechanisms” in crisis management: signal detection; preparation/prevention; containment 
(damage limitation); recovery; and learning. The majority of the crisis management studies 
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published in the 1990s focused on preparation/prevention, containment (damage limitation) 
and recovery, leaving the area of learning and the management of the resulting knowledge 
unexplored.  
 
In this early period of crisis management research, two opposing views emerged in the 
literature known as Normal Accident Theory (La Porte, 1994; Perrow, 1994) and High 
Reliability Theory (Rochlin, 1993). Normal Accident Theory (NAT) purports that modern 
organizations are exceedingly complex and consist of a high number of tightly coupled 
technical and human systems. Normal Accident theorists suggest that crises and disasters are 
unintentional but also that inevitable failures, or normal accidents, caused by the complexity 
of these systems lead to potentially destructive situations rapidly escalating beyond control 
and proliferating throughout the organization before anyone can understand what is happening 
and be able to intervene. Any crisis learning and knowledge is handicapped by the technical 
uncertainties and political barriers inherent in the complexity of these organizations (Sagan, 
1993).  
 
In contrast, High Reliability Theory (HRT) advocates that organizations can proactively 
control and reduce the risks of technical operations and avoid failures even in environments 
rich in the potential for error (Rochlin, 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 1999). It 
emphasizes good organizational design and management; safety as a priority; redundancy in 
both human and material resources; decentralized decision-making for proper and flexible 
responses to unexpected events; a ‘culture of reliability’ through continuous training and 
simulation; and the understanding of complex organizational systems by means of crisis 
knowledge management processes, including trial and error knowledge generation in the 
wake of near-miss events and accidents (Sagan, 1993). These two opposing views have given 
birth to a constructive dialogue that has brought the elements of organizational complexity, 
leadership, structure and culture as well as operational and learning processes to the epicenter 
of crisis management literature. However, the discussion of how to effectively manage the 
knowledge generated from a crisis either directly or ‘vicariously’ still remains limited (Nathan 
& Kovoor-Misra, 2002).  
 
With the exception of airlines, hospitality and tourism organizations in general diverge 
substantially from being High Reliability Organizations (HROs). The industry overall is 
highly fragmented, consisting of a large number of often closely-coupled organizations and 
encompassing a myriad of subcultures which reflect its structural complexity and 
occupational differentiation. All too often, middle managers’ and line employees’ objectives 
and practices do not conform with senior management's commitment for safety and quality 
and some professional beliefs and norms clash with HRO norms (e.g., speedy service for 
higher customer satisfaction as opposed to double checking of processes to ensure safety). 
 
When examining a crisis, it is useful to consider crisis knowledge from two points of 
view of the organization: the resource-based view (Grant, 1996; Kraaijenbrink, Spender & 
Groen, 2010; Von Krogh, 1998) and the knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Von Krogh, 1998). This is because from the resource-based 
perspective knowledge can be viewed as one of the many unique resources and capabilities 
that an organization needs acquire, deploy and control in order to increase its resilience to 
withstand turbulence, deal with crises and recover from them. Therefore the questions asked 
in a crisis investigation would revolve around whether the organization had these resources in 
place including the appropriately defined action, procedures and policies for knowledge 
creation and utilization which reflect the cognitivist approach to knowledge underpinning this 
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view (Von Krogh, 1998).   
 
In contrast, the knowledge-based view focuses on knowledge as the organization’s key 
strategic resource. The knowledge-based view portrays the organization as a set of 
competencies and repositories of knowledge which, when leveraged, transferred and 
subsequently exploited, enables them to effectively create and disseminate knowledge. 
Underpinned by the constructionist approach to knowledge (Von Krogh, 1998) which asserts 
that an organization cannot completely control knowledge but can merely facilitate a climate 
and infrastructure that enables knowledge resources to be managed, coordinated and utilized 
(Von Krogh, 1998), the crisis investigation would look for answers to a different set of 
questions revolving around organizational leadership, structure, crisis culture and 
communication (Stonehouse & Pemberton, 1999) as well as the levels of social interaction 
between the individuals in the organization (Wenger, McDermott & Snyder, 2002). 
 
Organizational leadership is an important component in devising and maintaining a 
learning and knowledge culture, where leaders become “designers, teachers and stewards” 
(Senge, 1992, cited in Stonehouse & Pemberton, 1999, p. 137). Skyrme (2000) advocates that 
leaders should demonstrate ‘knowledge leadership’ by encouraging the flow of knowledge 
among organizational members and the challenge of status quo in organizations. Leaders need 
to be supportive of knowledge management initiatives, in order to embed a knowledge culture 
throughout the organization (Abdullah & Othman, 2005). Whilst recognizing the importance 
of creating an organization-wide knowledge culture, Mitroff (2004) also argued for ‘crisis 
leadership’, which not only reacts to the crisis but also encourages a more proactive culture 
towards crisis and both forecasts and effectively manages all stages of a crisis. Appropriate 
crisis leadership is the underlying mindset, vision and actions that will shape the infrastructure 
and the crisis strategies. These include flexible delegation of authority during crisis situations; 
constant training and review of crisis processes; systems of rewards for reporting and 
discovering errors; and non-resistance when it comes to changes with short- or long-term 
effects on organizational crisis preparedness (La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Rochlin, 1996).  
 
Crisis management scholars view crisis culture as a subset of organizational culture 
dealing with the way people in an organization behave, communicate and perceive crises 
within their work settings (Marra, 2004; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). The crisis culture is 
partly inherent in the organization’s members (shaped by their underlying values, beliefs and 
attitudes) but is also influenced by the organization’s leadership. In their ‘onion model’ of 
crisis management, Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) place at its centre the ‘individual’, normally 
the organization’s leader, and at the next layer crisis culture as a set of organizational beliefs 
and rationalizations, pretty much imposed by the individual or individuals in the centre onto 
the rest of the organization, complemented by the relevant infrastructure, crisis plans and 
mechanisms. The underlying assumptions in this view of crisis culture are first that this 
culture is an attribute of an organization that can be broken down and described - in terms of 
artifacts, symbols, values and unconscious archetypes (Schein, 1985); and second that 
management can design strategies and impose rules and norms that can shape behavior within 
the organization. Senge (1990), on the other hand, encourages organizations to develop an 
enabling culture by going through a process of metanoia, or organizational catharsis, by 
unearthing deeply entrenched views and beliefs and changing accustomed ways of viewing 
and experiencing the world around them. The empowerment of individuals is vital, in order to 
encourage experimentation with new approaches to how business is conducted and the 




Pedler, Burgoyne and Boydell (1991) attest that an organization’s structure should also 
be designed and enabled for learning and knowledge. They view this structure as the 
arrangement of workflow and authority relationships within an organization, concerned with 
where decision-making power lies and how decisions are made. Flatter organizational 
structures tend to better assist the coordination and control of knowledge and are more 
appropriate to effective knowledge management as they aid communication and knowledge 
transfer (Stonehouse & Pemberton, 1999). This can present several challenges for the tourism 
industry which is characterized by high fragmentation, geographical dispersal and diversity of 
activities favoring hierarchical rather than flat structures. However, with the development of 
networks of inter-organizational relationships such as alliances, partnerships, clusters and 
communities of practice these challenges may be overcome (Cooper et al., 2010). 
 
The way knowledge is stored and communicated is also central to the way an 
organization capitalizes upon its knowledge assets. Communication among different 
organizational stakeholder groups facilitates the flow of knowledge into decision-making and 
thus results in creative responses and generation of new knowledge and ideas (McGregor, 
2001). It is enabled by checklists, decision guides and procedures, aimed at dealing with a 
crisis, limiting its potential adverse consequences to the organization’s employees, customers, 
assets and constituencies and ensuring the continuity of its mission-critical functions (Fink, 
1986; Quarantelli, 1988).  
   
Given the importance of these dimensions of knowledge management in the effective 
response of tourism organizations and destinations to a crisis, this paper addresses the 
following questions: What are the types of knowledge that are utilized in responding to a 
tourism crisis? What are the appropriate knowledge management strategies and processes that 
are applied to respond to a tourism crisis? And how do organizational factors (leadership, 






Since there is no clear framework on how crisis knowledge should be managed within 
an organization, this study adopted a social constructivist approach that explores multiple 
realities shaped by tangible and intangible mental constructions of executives who have 
experienced crises in their organizations and were able to discuss and propose ways for 
handling the ‘lessons learned’ from these crises. Guba and Lincoln (1998) argue that it is 
through these constructions that the participants experience the world and their actions are 
derived from the basis that these constructions form.  
 
We approached 32 tourism executives using a criterion sampling technique (Altinay & 
Paraskevas, 2007) with three criteria (corporate level tourism professionals; being in charge or 
directly involved with decisions related to risk/crisis management; and having experienced at 
least one crisis incident in their organizations).  A total of 21 executives from this sample 
agreed to participate in the study (Table 1).  
 
The informants from the hotel industry were accessed when one of the researchers was 
appointed as advisor to the Global Council on Safety, Security and Crisis Management of the 
International Hotel and Restaurant Association (IH&RA) in 2006. The interviews with this 
part of the sample were conducted between 2006 and 2009. The informants from destination 
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management organizations and the airline industry were approached and agreed to participate 
in the study during seminars on crisis/risk management led by one of the researchers in 2010 
and 2011 at an international travel and tourism fair in London, UK.  
 
The study used the Critical Incident Technique (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) asking the 
participants to recall and describe a crisis they experienced in their organizations and then for 
their insights on what was learnt from the crisis. The Critical Incident Technique interview  
 
 
Table 1 – Study Informants 
 





in the Field 
Chief Executive Officer Hotel Group South Europe 
North Africa 
M 36 years 
Chief Executive Officer Hotel Group Central Europe F 13 years 
Chief Executive Officer Hotel Group South Europe M 10 years 
Chief Information Officer Hotel Group Europe South 
America 
M 6 years 
Corporate Director of Security Hotel Group North America M 14 years 
Director of Business Resilience Airline Global F 3 years 
Director of Communications DMO Asia Pacific M 8 years 
Director of Communications DMO North Africa M 4 years 
Director of Corporate Affairs DMO Europe F 7 years 
Director of Security Hotel Group North America M 16 years 
Director Safety & Security  Airline Global M 8 years 
Global Director of Loss Prevention Hotel Group Asia Pacific M 7 years 
Risk Management Director Hotel Group Asia Pacific M 15 years 
Vice President Business Continuity Hotel Group Global F 7 years 
Vice President Corporate Security Hotel Group EMEA M 23 years 
Vice President Corporate Security & 
Safety 
Hotel Group Asia Pacific M 10 years 
Vice President Global Asset 
Management 
Hotel Group Global M 13 years 
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Vice President Loss Prevention Theme Park Global M 16 years 
Vice President Risk Management Hotel Group Global M 18 years 
Vice President Risk Management Hotel Group Global M 28 years 
Vice President Risk Management Hotel Group North America M 24 years 
 
 
was chosen for the following reasons: it  allows participants to express their personal 
views of the described incident (Stauss & Weinlich, 1997); it is inductive by nature – 
especially when the topic being investigated has not been well researched (Grove & Fisk 
1997); it yields a rich data set (Zeithaml & Bitner, 2003); and it is culturally neutral, insofar as 
it invites participants to offer their own perceptions on an issue, rather than indicate their 
perceptions to researcher-initiated questions  (De Ruyter, Perkins & Wetzels, 1995).  
 
The interviews lasted between 50 and 130 minutes, were transcribed verbatim and the 
transcripts were sent back to the informants for ‘member checking’ (verification of content 
and interpretation), in order to assure both an internal check for authenticity and the external 
validity (or transferability) of the overall study (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). The verified 
interview transcripts were coded and analyzed via N-Vivo 7 using generally accepted 
principles of critical discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1993) in order to (1) edit the transcript; (2) 
identify and summarize keyword(s) or key phrases; (3) make inferences; and (4) group 
inferences under common theme(s) and categorization into sub-themes.  
 
Although the replicability of the study cannot be guaranteed, every effort was made that 
the “trustworthiness” of the findings were secured (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). Therefore, the 
credibility of the study was ensured through the selection and use of a sample that can be 
considered as well-informed, relevant to the study and authoritative and by asking the 
informants to corroborate the findings through the use of ‘member checking’. Transferability 
was ensured by asking the informants to provide elaborate descriptions of their experiences of 
the critical incident they recalled and to provide a full description of the context and setting of 
this incident. Dependability was ensured by providing a clear description of the research 
design used and the direct quotations from the data as an audit trail. Finally, confirmability 
was ensured by holding all theories, assumptions, and prior knowledge aside during the data 
collection process and by trying to understand and interpret what was occurring and why it 
had occurred during the data analysis. 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Following the ‘critical incident’ approach, informants were asked to recall the ‘one’ 
crisis that was so significant for them in (shaping their view of crisis management), that they 
had to think it over and over again many times in their lives with all its details. Informants 
identified different forms of crises, including terrorist attacks, food poisonings and extreme 
weather phenomena.  
 
Informants also made an evaluation of their ‘crisis management knowledge’ at the time 
when the crisis hit their organizations as well as of the ways that they had acquired this 
knowledge. The informants gave examples of different forms of knowledge creation at every 
single stage of crisis management as a result of not only social interaction but also from 
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testing existing knowledge in tabletop exercises and simulations (in the signal detection and 
prevention/preparedness stages) and interaction with the dynamic environment of the crisis  
(containment and recovery stages). The framework illustrated in Figure 1 is developed based 
on the analysis and the discussion of the findings that illustrate the types of crisis knowledge, 
knowledge management strategies and processes and the organizational factors that influence 









Types of Crisis Knowledge  
 
In the center of our framework in Figure 1 lie four types of crisis knowledge revealed by 
the analysis of the extracts relevant to knowledge possessed at the time of the crisis. These 
crisis knowledge types were labeled as: procedural, behavioral, third party and “learned 
ignorance”. 
 
Procedural knowledge was possessed and displayed by respondents in organizations 
with clearly articulated crisis management plans which were also specific to the crisis they 
were facing. This knowledge involves steps on ‘how to’ respond to a particular crisis with 
clearly articulated tasks regarding the crisis itself the operational continuity during the crisis 
and the media communication. In Choo’s (1998) terms this is explicit knowledge that is 
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primarily rule-based, including crisis management routines, rules and procedures, but can also 
be object-based including reports, and readings of gauges indicating deviations from 
acceptable standards. Normally procedural knowledge is also rehearsed in exercises 
undertaken to ensure alignment with the standards of response. This type of knowledge was 
favored by organizations in our sample who took a HRT approach to crisis knowledge 
management, i.e., some hotel groups but more particularly the airlines.  
 
Contrary to the common belief (Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993) that explicit knowledge is a 
major source of competitive advantage, in crisis situations, procedural knowledge alone and 
strict adherence to standards as prescribed by the crisis management plan may become 
problematic. In the case of a simultaneous food poisoning in 13 properties of a hotel group 
due to contamination by the bacterium ‘vibrio parahaemolyticus’ tiger prawns served raw in 
the hotels’ sushi buffet, a well planned and exercised response failed because, by following 
“religiously” every step of the procedure, the respondents were too slow in responding to the 
varying levels of crisis in different properties. 
 
Procedural knowledge alone therefore runs the risk of becoming inflexible and may lead 
to the inappropriate level of crisis response altogether. Commenting on ‘lessons learnt’ from 
this crisis, the respondent actually indicated a second type of knowledge required in any crisis 
situation.  
 
“If there is one lesson to be learned from this crisis, is that we should spend 
more time in training our managers on how to respond to a crisis, set some general 
rules and then trust their judgment, let them do what they think is appropriate. They 
should be more than capable to deal with situations like this and, if they need support, 
we will be there for them” (Hotel Group, Chief Executive Officer, Excerpt 1, Stanza 
9). 
 
Behavioral knowledge, therefore, is a second type of crisis knowledge shaped both 
formally through the knowledge of organizational crisis management standards, procedures 
and mechanisms and informally through social interactions with peers, customers, suppliers 
and partners. Several advocates of behavioral knowledge among the respondents emphasized 
its superiority over the procedural and often used the term “simple rules” in their discourse.  
 
“You cannot say to the members of your staff ‘this is what we want you to do or 
not do’. You have to say ‘this is how we want you to be’. If you give them a solid 
foundation with a few simple rules, it will be easier to assimilate them into the culture 
you want to create” (Destination Management Organization, Director of 
Communications, Excerpt 2, Stanza 2).  
 
Some went a step further advising that sophisticated training aiming at procedural 
knowledge may not be effective: 
 
“We expect the General Manager to be able to resolve the situation by 
themselves, in collaboration with the authorities and we provide support and guidance 
only if requested. Our main role is to provide them with tools that will help them make 
the right decision. We are trying to give them some simple guidelines and tools to deal 
with this complex issue. We are not looking for sophisticated training: a line employee 
or a general manager cannot become a terrorism expert. With the turnover in our 
industry this would never be effective” (Hotel Group, Vice President Corporate Safety 
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and Security, Excerpt 3, Stanza 3). 
 
This is a much more complex form of knowledge in that a part of it may be shared by 
many in the organization but another part is individual, determined by factors such as the 
individual’s psychology, personal judgment, risk attitude and, belief system. These factors 
contribute to differences in behavioral knowledge and lead to the individuality of behavior 
during a crisis. In that sense it can be both explicit knowledge - codified, according to 
Johnson & Lundvall (2001), in policies and training about how one should behave in a crisis 
situation - and tacit (by shaping and replicating ‘role model’ behavior or by filtering model 
behaviors through a personalization process  as suggested by Hansen et al.(1999).   
 
“We train staff in crisis management following the ‘One-Two-Three cycle’. Step 
One of the cycle is ‘report anything you feel suspicious, abnormal or presenting a risk 
for the hotel and its people’ to the next level of command. Step Two is ‘minimize the 
risk’, by evacuating the premises, restricting access to the risk, etc. Step Three is 
‘solve the problem’ which also involves making sure that the situation is resolved. 
Resolution will vary depending on the individual but we know that there is not only 
one correct way” (Hotel Group, Vice President Corporate Safety and Security, Excerpt 
3, Stanza 2). 
 
Learned Ignorance (from the work of the catholic cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus ‘De Docta 
Ignorantia’) is a third type of knowledge that emerges in crisis situations. This is the 
‘knowledge of no-knowledge’, i.e., the realization that the individual does not possess the 
knowledge needed to define the crisis or to deal with it. This condition of “knowing what you 
do not know” correlates with the externalization of the individual’s uncertainty from what a 
respondent described as “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”. This distinction of 
uncertainty is akin to what risk scholars call stochastic uncertainty and structural uncertainty 
(see Helton, 1994; Rowe, 1994). In the former the probabilities for a range of response 
outcomes are known, whereas in the latter they are ambiguous. Consequently, learned 
ignorance evokes two types of action.  
 
The first is an understanding of both what knowledge exists and what knowledge is 
needed to fill the gap so that the crisis - a “known unknown” - can swiftly be reframed and 
dealt with. The search for such knowledge can be undertaken within or outside the 
organization. Several proponents of crisis knowledge repositories emphasized the usefulness 
of such databases in situations of ‘learned ignorance’ as they would also offer a repertoire of 
responses for a particular time and thus make crisis response faster. 
 
“The threat was downplayed in this meeting. Nevertheless, we decided to inform 
our Internet service provider (ISP) and the police cybercrime unit about it and two 
members of the team were assigned with the task to explore some off-the-shelf 
solutions that had recently been developed specifically to fight DoS [Denial of 
Service] attacks and buy the best one. We felt confident that these steps would protect 
us” (Hotel Group, Chief Information Officer, Excerpt 5, Stanza 5). 
 
The second is speculative action and experimentation due to lack of comprehension of 
the crisis (reasoning from a position of ignorance facing an “unknown unknown”): 
 
“We realized that this is not an ordinary crisis when the pilot said that all four 
engines had failed leaving only critical systems on backup electrical power. This is 
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something we had never encountered before and we had to make decisions in the dark. 
We did not know how the ash cloud could have affected the systems and had to try 
two or three different things while the aircraft was losing altitude. Several attempts to 
restart the engines was one of them” (Airline, Director of Business Resilience, Excerpt 
4, Stanza 6). 
 
‘Third party’ knowledge reflected in expert knowledge that exists outside the 
organization is a fourth type of crisis knowledge resulting from identified ‘learned ignorance’. 
. This type of knowledge may be available for internalization or could remain external and 
just be used for the resolution of a crisis. 
 
“When we realized that this attack was beyond our capabilities we turned to an 
IT security specialist. […] The security specialist had a plan on how to build our 
defense but our infrastructure was not enough for this plan to be executed. In order to 
protect ourselves from this threat we had to have an infrastructure which was at least 
equal with the attackers’. For that, we had to involve our ISP and all of us together 
were able to build a defense network against the attackers” (Hotel Group, Chief 
Information Officer, Excerpt 5, Stanza 7). 
 
It should be pointed out, however that these four types of crisis knowledge do not have 
clearly delineated boundaries, since knowledge that may seem procedural may also have 
behavioral aspects or contain information about ‘third party’ knowledge and vice versa. Some 
will perceive only the procedural aspects of this bundle and others more or all aspects of it.  
 
Crisis Knowledge Management Flows, Strategies and Processes  
 
Moving to the second box of the framework in Figure 1, we listed the ways that 
respondents indicated that crisis  knowledge ‘enters’ their organizations, the ways it is 
transferred or shared between constituents and stakeholders and the way that it is assimilated 
and becomes part of the organization’s identity and existence. The analysis of the responses 
further showed that there are mainly two flows of knowledge within the organization: the first 
is the flow of institutionalized crisis knowledge and the second is the flow of emergent crisis 
knowledge. 
  
Most informants brought examples of how prior knowledge (or lack of it) influenced 
their decision making during the critical incidents they experienced. They therefore found it 
imperative that explicit knowledge was created from crises that the organization has 
experienced itself, knowledge gained from crises that other organizations went through 
(Nathan & Kovoor-Misra, 2002) and knowledge acquired from expert third parties should be 
properly documented and stored in the organization’s knowledge repositories. The flow of 
institutionalized crisis knowledge begins from these repositories and is all about the sharing 
and integration of this knowledge. Most informants associated this flow of knowledge with 
terms such as “scripts”, “frames”, “standard operating procedures”, “posters”, “courses”, “ten-
minute-trainers”, “pocket memos”, i.e., what Schulz and Jobe (1998) call codified knowledge 
being disseminated throughout the organization. However, this codification is appropriate 
only for certain types of knowledge that can be explicitly described (Johnson & Lundvall, 
2001).  
 
When it came to tacit knowledge it became apparent that personalization strategies were 
favored by informants who talked more about the provision of conditions that enable such 
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dissemination through “molecular structures”, “enhancement of social networks” and, 
“scenario planning retreats”. These informants emphasized the role of human “knowledge 
carriers” (confirming Hansen et al., 1999) in both sharing and integration processes, 
particularly of behavioral knowledge. The Vice President Business Continuity of a hotel 
group, for example, noted that they created and shared crisis knowledge through the adoption 
of a “molecular” structure in crisis response. They pull together people with a cross-section of 
skills from various regions in which the group operates and form a team that would deal with 
a specific crisis. Once adequate levels of interaction and knowledge creation within this 
structure are achieved, the individuals are transferred to new areas, thus “cross-pollinating the 
organization with the newly created knowledge” (Excerpt 6, Stanza 8).  
 
The role of social interaction (Wenger et al., 2002) becomes even more important in the 
second flow of knowledge within the organization, that of emergent crisis knowledge. Such 
knowledge is created under conditions of real uncertainty (e.g., an actual crisis situation) or a 
simulated one (e.g., scenario planning or crisis plan testing). Here, ‘learned ignorance’ evokes 
the shift from “know what and know how” to “know who has the knowledge” (Hotel Group, 
Vice President Business Continuity, Excerpt 6, Stanza 10). Clearly, this flow is about creation 
and acquisition of new knowledge. The knowledge that emerges is a result of a collective 
effort to reduce uncertainty through rationalization (for “known unknowns”) or improvisation 
and experimentation (for “unknown unknowns”).  
 
“It is all about bringing all the ‘right’ people together to create something new 
from what is already there. They will draw together existing ideas in a unique way, a 
novel unexpected idea will emerge through conversation between them and they will 
try it until they find the answer” (Destination Management Organization, Director of 
Corporate Affairs, Excerpt 11, Stanza 11). 
 
The knowledge created in this flow will enter the institutionalized flow, be codified and 
personalized in order to complement or replace knowledge that already exists in the 
organization and will continue to be disseminated throughout the organization until new 
emergent knowledge is institutionalized and makes the existing one obsolete.  
 
Influence of Organizational Factors on the Management of Crisis Knowledge 
 
Surrounding the types and flows of crisis knowledge and the strategies by which they 
are acquired, shared and embedded in the organization are the four inter-related factors 
identified by Stonehouse and Pemberton (1999) as the antecedents of knowledge management 
in organizational renewal (Figure 1).  
 
The informants felt that leadership should play a key role in creating and sustaining an 
organizational environment within which crisis knowledge is “proactively” (emphasized by 
the majority of them) created, integrated, shared and applied. In line with the arguments of 
Senge (1992), leaders have to make sure that they provide all the ‘means’ so that the ‘lessons 
learnt’ (i.e., acquired and codified knowledge) from a crisis are accessed, assimilated and 
disseminated throughout the organization. This proactive approach is strongly advocated by 
Mitroff (2005) when he talks about ‘crisis leadership’ and is a core premise of HRT which 
seeks to improve reliability in high risk settings as opposed to the NAT which stresses 





When elaborated further to explore the specifics of the role, it was found that leadership 
should have a facilitating and coordinating role through the provision of the right amount of 
training, knowledge, resources and support of the regional and local managers and employees 
by teaching them “how to fish” rather than simply giving them fish. Skyrme (2000) professes 
that an ‘ideal’ style to engender this practice is ‘knowledge leadership’, as it involves the constant 
development and innovation of knowledge and individual skills. More importantly, however, 
leadership has the responsibility to create a blame-free “test-and-learn” environment, a 
condition also identified by Edvarsson (2008) who argues that organizations need to provide 
opportunities for individuals to take informed risks. Leaders should not blame a crisis on 
particular individuals, but instead use the acquired knowledge to redesign improved crisis 
management mechanisms.    
 
“Provided that the unsuccessful response is not due to negligence, lack of 
forethought or irresponsible risk taking, there is no reason to start looking for culprits 
and scapegoats. Instead we give adequate time for our people to reflect about what 
went wrong and what should be done or not done next time in order to prevent the 
crisis or minimize its damage. By not penalizing action, we do not only encourage 
initiative but we also set staff expectations” (Destination Management Organization, 
Director of Corporate Affairs, Excerpt 11, Stanza 12). 
 
Both HRT and NAT stress the importance of knowledge creation from errors and near 
misses. However, the proponents of the two perspectives have different views on how feasible 
this knowledge creation is. The overall goal of these leadership activities is to embed a crisis 
culture, which would enhance the organization’s ability to detect early crisis signals and 
enable their prevention, improve crisis response and accelerate crisis recovery. Informants 
described such a culture as one of openness and participation that encourages free two-way 
communication and sharing of responsibility for decision making and action. These findings 
are in line with the arguments of HRT advocates such as La Porte and Consolini (1991) and 
Rochlin (1996) on an enabling crisis culture. The informants did not seem to share NAT 
scholars (Perrow, 1994; Sagan, 1993) concerns who, although they recognize that 
organizations can develop crisis knowledge from their failures, tend to be pessimistic about 
the creation of the required blame-free culture.   
 
These findings also appear to refute Pauchant and Mitroff’s (1992) assumption that 
crisis culture can be imposed by senior management. Rather, they show that crisis culture is 
an emergent property arising from the continuing negotiations about values, meanings and 
priorities between the organizational members and the environment within which they 
operate. 
 
Some informants warned that an organization-wide crisis culture that demands action 
‘strictly by the book’, based upon procedural knowledge, with consequences (reprimand) for 
people who deviate, should also be avoided. As an informant affirmed, such a culture may 
make the organization inflexible and its crisis response ineffective:  
 
“We were so pre-occupied with reports and compliance that we, unwillingly, 
created a culture of fear and not a culture of safety awareness. We should concentrate 
more on why a mistake was made rather than on who did it. We drowned in papers 
when we should be responding to a mega-crisis” (Hotel Group, Vice President Loss 




Several informants shared the view that a tight, control-oriented management style often 
leads to an organization’s ‘inward looking-ness’ and isolation from its environment and also 
to an illusion of ‘invulnerability’. Excessive focus on standards and processes in order to 
achieve performance levels of an HRO often comes to the detriment of crisis response. They, 
therefore, favored non-hierarchical organizational structures and proposed “molecular’” or 
matrix / network structures, as they provide flexibility and allow ‘cross-pollination’. This 
finding corroborates Stonehouse & Pemberton’s (1999) views who argue that effective 
knowledge management requires an enabling decentralized structure that empowers 
employees to learn from previous crises, gives them the flexibility to disseminate knowledge 
throughout the organization and the authority to play an active role to help the organization 
institutionalize learning from crisis situations.  Flexible structures also imply loose-coupling 
(reduction of inevitable crises according to the NAT) and offer the organization ‘slack’, i.e., 
buffers or redundancies that may mitigate negative impact of a crisis. 
 
The way knowledge is codified, stored and shared is central to the way an organization 
capitalizes upon its knowledge assets (Stonehouse & Pemberton, 1999). Communication was 
also identified as an important aspect central to the management of crisis knowledge. The 
advent of information and communication technologies has paved the way for the encoding, 
manipulation and transmission of knowledge throughout the organization. The informants 
considered this highly important and crucial in response to crisis. The Vice President Loss 
Prevention, of a hotel group commented that “it would be ideal to have ‘abundant and 
redundant’ communication platforms to increase our effectiveness” (Excerpt 6, Stanza 2). 
Other informants stated that these platforms should facilitate the sharing of crisis-related 
information within, as well as across, the organization’s boundaries with the rest of its 
stakeholders (including competitors).  
 
When elaborated further to identify the communication platforms, the informants 
pointed out the development of crisis knowledge repositories storing standards, training 
material and best practices and of “yellow-pages-like” crisis knowledge directories, with 
information on “who is an expert in what and how they can be contacted” within the 
organization (Airline, Director of Business Resilience, Excerpt 4, Stanza 15). Some 
informants also noted that web-technologies have facilitated the development of company 
intranets and extranets as well as the design of specialized crisis sites and online learning 
centers (a step up from repositories). One informant (Hotel Group, Senior Vice President 
Global Risk Management, Excerpt 9, Stanza 8) stated that they are using social media 
(namely Facebook and Twitter) in order to engage their staff in the various training modes 
offered by their Risk and Crisis Learning Centre, thus facilitating the process of crisis 




Recognizing the importance of knowledge in tourism crisis management (Blackman & 
Ritchie, 2008; Blackman et al., 2011) our study aimed to identify the types of knowledge and 
different knowledge management strategies that are being employed by tourism organizations 
in order to respond to crises they are facing. Informed by the resource- and knowledge-based 
views of knowledge management, our research identified four types of ‘crisis specific 
knowledge’: procedural, behavioral, third party knowledge and ‘learned ignorance’. This 
categorization of crisis knowledge goes beyond the generally accepted typology of tacit and 
explicit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966; Choo, 1988) and enables crisis managers develop specific 
knowledge exploitation strategies (creation, acquisition, sharing and integration) for each one 
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of them. A key finding of the study was that procedural knowledge alone, although favored 
among organizations with a more resource-based view of knowledge management, can 
become problematic in crisis situations as it does not allow flexibility and may lead to sub-
optimal or inappropriate response. It should always be complemented by behavioral 
knowledge which can be both tacit and explicit and was found by the informants, contrary to 
the common belief (Hedlund & Nonaka, 1993), as superior to the procedural knowledge, 
when it comes to crisis situations.  
 
The paper draws upon the literature to identify knowledge management strategies and 
processes for crisis management by providing empirical evidence on how tourism 
organizations manage knowledge and knowledge flows in order to develop effective 
responses to crisis situations. HRT and NAT raise some issues surrounding the creation and 
management of crisis knowledge as each theory considers some organizational aspects 
affecting crisis knowledge management and overlooks others. The study showed that they can 
be used as points of reference rather than as roadmaps since both approaches have strengths 
and can make a valuable contribution to crisis knowledge management by assessing the trade-
offs associated with the creation of crisis knowledge and by identifying contexts in which this 
knowledge creation is more likely to be effective.  
 
The paper goes further however, by identifying two distinct flows of crisis knowledge in 
organizations: institutionalized and emergent. The institutionalized knowledge flow involves 
the movement of knowledge both within and outside of the organization. Codification and 
personalization strategies enable the sharing and integration of the different types of crisis 
knowledge through the institutionalized knowledge flow, embedding it into the organization’s 
crisis response system. The emergent knowledge flow is normally triggered by unexpected 
crisis situations where the institutionalized knowledge proves inadequate for an effective 
response, i.e., by what we have identified as ‘learned ignorance’. In this knowledge flow, 
organizations usually create, (and sometimes acquire, ‘third party’) knowledge through 
enhanced social interaction of individuals from within and outside the organization (Wenger 
et al., 2002), enabling cross-fertilization, experimentation, and generation of the new 
knowledge which, in turn, will become institutionalized and be disseminated and integrated 
until it becomes obsolete. Another important enabling condition for this knowledge flow was 
found to be a ‘blame-free’ environment which is consistent with Mitroff’s (2005) assertions 
on crisis leadership.  
 
Further, the study has shown that four distinct organizational factors, namely 
organizational leadership and structure, crisis culture and communication interact with, and 
impact upon each other influencing the organization’s ability to manage crisis knowledge. 
Crisis leadership plays an important role in the implementation of codification and 
personalization knowledge management strategies through their explicit support to the crisis 
management plans and the exploitation of their visionary and proactive leadership skills. 
However, codification, personalization, creation, integration and sharing of knowledge would 
not be possible unless the tourism organization creates a crisis aware, ‘enabling culture’ that 
represents key values including openness, sharing and participation, in line with HRT 
theorists (Rochlin, 1996; Weick et al., 1999). These values can be embedded, and thus the 
knowledge strategies and processes (creation, sharing through codification and 
personalization and integration) can be facilitated by adopting a decentralized structure and 
creating abundant and redundant communication platforms.  
 
The proposed framework of crisis knowledge types, flows and strategies can help 
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practitioners in the tourism industry better understand the elements, processes and 
organizational conditions required for the development of crisis knowledge policies and 
strategies that will enhance the resilience of their organizations, strengthen their defense 
mechanisms, limit potential damages and allow them to recover bounce from a crisis situation 
back to normalcy faster. It can also be used as a basis for further research regarding the 
governance of this crisis knowledge management system. One direction for research would be 
the development of an appropriate performance measurement methodology for the 
organization’s crisis knowledge management system with a series of appropriate metrics and 
controls. Another would be to actually measure crisis leadership and culture and its influence 
on knowledge management and/or crisis preparedness.  
 
The findings of this study, however, need also to be viewed taking into consideration 
certain research design limitations which do not allow broad generalizations. One of the 
limitations is that the sample of the study was not representative of the tourism industry since 
a significant part of the informants (15/21) came from hotel groups and certain sectors were 
not represented. This requires some caution in any generalization of the findings. A further 
limitation related to the selected sample was that it included only executives. By having a 
wider range of stakeholders the study would produce multiple perspectives on crisis 
knowledge management, leading to perhaps richer and more robust findings.  Finally, one 
further limitation of the research design was that the CIT encouraged the informants to focus 
on large scale crises, ignoring this way the more common types of day-to-day crisis 
management that involve knowledge resources. A focus on the latter would perhaps 
demonstrate how the intensity, scope and duration of a crisis impact the entire knowledge 




Abdullah, H.B. & Othman, A.B. (2005). The influence of leadership on organizational culture 
and its effects on knowledge management initiative. Retrieved May 13, 2011, from 
http://ickm.upm.edu.my/presenter1.html.  
Altinay, L. & Paraskevas. A. (2007). Planning Research in Hospitality and Tourism, Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Anderson, B.A. (2006). Crisis Management in the Australian Tourism Industry: Preparedness, 
personnel, and postscript. Tourism Management. 27, 1290-1297. 
Armstrong, E.K., & Ritchie, B.W. (2008). The heart recovery marketing campaign: 
destination recovery after a major bushfire in Australia’s national capital. Journal of Travel 
and Tourism Marketing, 23(2-4), 175-189. 
Badaracco, J.L. (1991). The Knowledge Link: How Firms Compete Through Strategic 
Alliances, Harvard Business School Press. Boston: MA. 
Barnes, S. (2002). Knowledge Management Systems: Theory and Practice, Oxford, Thomson 
Learning. 
Beirman, D. (2003). Restoring Tourism Destinations in Crisis. A Strategic Marketing 
Approach, Wallingford: CABI. 
Blackler, F. (1995). Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organizations: An Overview and 
Analysis. Organization Studies, 16 (6), 1021-1046. 
Blackman, D. & Ritchie, B. (2008). Tourism crisis management, knowledge management and 
organizational learning in C. Pforr & P. Hosie, (Eds.), Beating the Odds: Crisis 
Management in the Tourism Industry (pp. 53-74). London: Ashgate. 
Blackman, D., Kennedy, M. & Ritchie, B. (2011). Knowledge management: The missing link 
17 
 
in DMO crisis management? Current Issues in Tourism, 14 (4), 337-354. 
Bouncken, R. & Sungsoo, P. (2002). Knowledge Management in Hospitality and Tourism. 
New York: The Haworth Hospitality Press. 
Brinkley, I. (2008). How Knowledge is Reshaping the Economic Life of Nations. Economy 
Interim Report. The Work Foundation. 
Bromiley, P. & Marcus, A. (1989). The Deterrent to Dubious Corporate Behavior: 
Profitability, Probability and Safety Recalls. Strategic Management Journal, 10 (3), 233-
250. 
Carroll, R.F & Tansey, R.R. (2000). Intellectual capital in the new internet economy: its 
meaning, measurement and management for enhancing quality. Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 1 (4), 296-311. 
Choo, C.W. (1998). The knowing organization: how organizations use information to 
construct meaning, create knowledge, and make decisions. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Clark, G.L. (2011). Myopia and the global financial crisis: Context-specific reasoning, market 
structure, and institutional governance. Dialogues in Human Geography 1(1), 4-25. 
Cooper, C. (2006). Knowledge Management and Tourism. Annals of Tourism Research, 
33(1), 47-64. 
Cooper, C., Baggio, R. & Scott, N. (2010). Network Science. A Review Focused on Tourism. 
Annals of Tourism Research, 37 (3), 802-827. 
De Ruyter, K., Perkins, D.S. & Wetzels, M. (1995). Consumer-Defined Service Expectations 
and Post Purchase Dissatisfaction in Moderately-Priced Restaurants: A Cross-National 
Study. Journal of Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, and Complaining Behavior, 8(1), 
177-187. 
Edvardsson, I.R. (2008). HRM and knowledge management. Employee Relations, 30 (5), 553-
561. 
Elbanna, A.R. (2008). Strategic systems implementation:  diffusion through drift. Journal of 
Information Technology, 23, 89-96. 
Fall, L.T., & Massey, J.E. (2006). The significance of crisis communication in the aftermath 
of 9/11. Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 19 (2-3), 77-90. 
Faulkner, B. (2001). Towards a framework for tourism disaster management, Tourism 
Management, 22 (2), 135-147. 
Fink, S. (1986). Crisis management: planning for the inevitable. New York, NY: American 
Management Association. 
Fink, S., Beak, J. & Taddeo, K. (1971). Organizational Crisis and Change. Journal of Applied 
Behavioral Science, 7 (1), 15-37. 
Flanagan, J.C. (1954). The Critical Incident Technique, Psychological Bulletin, 51(4), 327–
358. 
Grant, R.M. (1996). Prospering in dynamically-competitive environments: organizational 
capability as knowledge integration. Organization Science, 7 (4), 375–87. 
Gore, C. & Gore E. (1999). Knowledge Management: the way forward. Total Quality 
Management, 10 (5), 554-560 
Gourlay S.N. (2002). Tacit knowledge, tacit knowing or behaving?. 3rd European 
Organizational Knowledge, Learning, and Capabilities conference, Athens, Greece, 5-6 
April . 
Grove, S.J. & Fisk, R.P. (1997). The Impact of Other Customers on Service Experiences: A 
Critical Incident Examination of ‘Getting Along’, Journal of Retailing, 73(1), 63-85. 
Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research. In N. K. 
Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research. London: Sage. 
Hansen, M.T., Nohria, N. & Tierney, T. (1999). What's your strategy for managing 
18 
 
knowledge? Harvard Business Review, 77 (2), 106-116. 
Helton, J.C. (1994). Treatment of Uncertainty in Performance Assessments in Complex 
Systems. Risk Analysis, 14(4), 483-511. 
Hitt, M. A. (1998). Presidential address: Twenty-first century organizations: Business firms, 
business schools, and the academy. The Academy of Management Review, 23, 218−224. 
Hjalager, A. (2002). Repairing Innovation Defectiveness in Tourism. Tourism Management, 
23, 465-474. 
Houghton, J. & Sheehan, P. (2000). A Primer on the Knowledge Economy. Centre for 
Strategic Economic Studies, Victoria University. 
Hystad, P.W. & Keller, P.C. (2008). Towards a Destination Tourism Disaster Management 
Framework: Long-Term Lessons from a Forest Fire Disaster, Tourism Management, 29 
(1), 151-162. 
Jasimuddin, S.M., Klein, J.H. & Connell, C. (2005). The paradox of using tacit and explicit 
knowledge: strategies to face dilemmas. Management Decision, 43, 102-112. 
Johnson B. & Lundvall, B-A. (2001). Why all this fuss about codified and tacit knowledge? 
Presented at the DRUID Winter Conference January 18th-20th. 
Kabak, I.W. & Siomkos, G. (1990). How Can an Industrial Crisis be Managed Effectively? 
Industrial Engineering, 22 (6), 18-21. 
Klein, D.A. (2008). Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital. Woburn, MA: 
Butterworth-Heinemann 
Kogut, B. & Zander, U. (1996). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science, 3 (3), 383-97. 
Kraaijenbrink, J., Spender, J.C. & Groen, A.J. (2010) The Resource-Based View: A Review 
and Assessment of Its Critiques, Journal of Management, 36 (2), 349-372. 
La Porte, T.R. (1994), A Strawman Speaks Up: Comments on The Limits of Safety, Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2(4), 207-211. 
La Porte, T.R. & Consolini, P. (1991). Working in practice but not in theory: Theoretical 
challenges of High-Reliability Organizations. Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory, 1, 19–47. 
Marcus, A.A. & Goodman, R.S. (1991). Victims and Shareholders: The Dilemmas of 
Presenting Corporate Policy During a Crisis. Academy of Management Journal,  34 (5), 
281-305.  
Marra, F.J. (2004). Excellent crisis communication: Beyond crisis plans. In R. L. Heath, & D. 
P. Millar (Eds.), Responding to crisis: A rhetorical approach to crisis communication 
(311–325). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
McCall H., Arnold, V. & Sutton, S. G. (2008). Use of knowledge management systems and 
the impact on declarative knowledge acquisition. Journal of Information Systems, 22, 77 
- 101. 
Mistilis, N., & Sheldon, P. (2006). Knowledge management for tourism crises and disasters. 
Tourism Review International, 10(1), 39-46. 
Mitroff, I.I. (1988). Crisis Management: Cutting through the Confusion. Sloan Management 
Review. Winter, 15-20. 
Mitroff, I.I. (2004). Crisis Leadership: Planning for the Unthinkable. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc. 
Mitroff, I.I., Shrivastava, P. & Udwadia, F.E. (1987). Effective Crisis Management. Academy 
of Management Executive, 1 (3), 283-292. 
Nickerson, J.A. & Zenger, T.R. (2004). A Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm: The 
Problem Solving Perspective. Organization Science, 15(5), 617-632. 
Pauchant, T.C., & Mitroff, I.I. (1992). Transforming the Crisis Prone Organization. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
19 
 
Paraskevas, A. & Arendell, B. (2007). A Strategic Framework for Terrorism Prevention and 
Mitigation in Tourism Destinations. Tourism Management, 28 (6), 1560-1573. 
Pedler, M., Burgoyne, J. & Boydell, T. (1991). The Learning Company. A strategy for 
sustainable development. London, McGraw-Hill. 
Perrow, C. (1994), The Limits of Safety: The Enhancement of a Theory of Accidents,  
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2(4), 212-220. 
Polanyi, M. (1966). The Tacit Dimension. London, Routledge. 
Quarantelli, E.L. (1988). Disaster crisis management: A summary of research findings. 
Journal of Management Studies, 25, 373–385 
Rasmussen, J., & Batstone, R. (1989). Why Do Complex Organizational Systems Fail? 
Proceedings of a Cross-Disciplinary Workshop in Safety Control and Risk Management. 
Washington, D.C, World Bank. 
Ravetz, J.R.  (1971). Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 
Ritchie, B.W. (2004). Chaos, Crises and Disasters: A Strategic Approach to Crisis 
Management in the Tourism Industry, Tourism Management, 25 (6), 669-683. 
Roberts, J. (2000). From know-how to show-how? Questioning the role of information and 
communication technologies in knowledge transfer. Technology Analysis and Strategy 
Management, 12 (4), 429-443. 
Rochlin, G.I. (1993) Defining ‘High Reliability’ Organizations: A Comparative Framework, 
in Roberts, K. H. (Ed) (1993) New Challenges to Understanding Organizations. New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Company. pp. 11-32.  
Rochlin, G.I. (1996). Reliable Organizations, Present Research and Future Directions. Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 4 (2), 55-59. 
Rowe, W.D. (1994). Understanding Uncertainty. Risk Analysis, 14(5), 743-750. 
Rylander, A (2009). Design thinking as knowledge work: epistemological foundations and 
practical implications. Design Management Journal, 4 (1), 7-19. 
Santana, G. (2004) Crisis Management and Tourism. Beyond the Rhetoric. Journal of Travel 
& Tourism Marketing, 15 (4), 299-321. 
Sagan, S.D. (1993). The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Schein, E. H. ( 1985). Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Schultz, P.D. & Seeger, M.W. (1991). Corporate Centered Apologia: Iacocca in Defense of 
Chrysler. Speaker and Cavel, 28 (1/4), 50-60. 
Schulz, M. & Jobe, L. (2001). Codification and Tacitness as Knowledge Management 
Strategies: an Empirical Exploration. Academy of Management Journal, 44 (4), 661-681. 
Seeger, M.W. (1986). The Challenger Tragedy and Search for Legitimacy. Central States 
Speech Journal, 37 (3), 147-157. 
Sellnow, T.L. (1993). Scientific Argument in Organizational Crisis Communication: The 
Case of Exxon. Argumentation and Advocacy, 30 (1), 28-43. 
Senge, P. (1992).  Systems Thinking: A language for learning and acting.  Farmington Mass:  
Innovation Associates. 
Skyrme, D. J. (2000). Developing a knowledge strategy: From management to leadership. In 
D. Morey, M. Maybury,&B. Thuraisingham (Eds.), Knowledge management: Classic and 
contemporary works (61-84). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Smith, D., (1990). Beyond Contingency Planning: Towards a Model of Crisis Management. 
Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 4 (4), 263-275. 
Smith, E.A. (2001). The role of Tacit and Explicit Knowledge in the Workplace. Journal of 
Knowledge Management, 5, 311-318. 
Stauss, B. & Weinlich, B. (1997). Process-Oriented Measurement of Service Quality: 
20 
 
Applying the Sequential Incident Technique, European Journal of Marketing, 31(1), 33-
55. 
Stonehouse, G.H. & Pemberton, J.D. (1999). Learning and knowledge management in the 
intelligent organization. Participation and Empowerment: An International Journal, 7 (5), 
131-144. 
Turner, B.A. (1976). The Organizational and Inter-Organizational Development of Disasters. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21 (3), 378-397. 
Van Dijk, T. A. (1993), Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse & Society, 4 (1), 
249-283 
Weick, K.E. (2001). Making Sense of the Organization. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 
Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., & Obstfeld, D. (1999). Organizing for High Reliability: 
Processes of Collective Mindfulness. In B. M. Staw & L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in 
Organizational Behavior  21, 81-123. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc. 
Weidenfeld, A., Williams, M.A., & Butler, W.R. (2010). Knowledge Transfer and Innovation 
among Attractions. Annals of Tourism Research, 37 (3), 604-626. 
Wenger, E., McDermott, R., & Snyder, W., M. (2002). Cultivating Communities of Practice: 
A Guide to Managing Knowledge: Seven Principles for Cultivating Communities of 
Practice. Cambridge, Harvard Business Press. 
Von Krogh, G. (1998). Care in knowledge creation.  California Management Review, 40 
(3), 133-153. 
Xiao, H. & Smith, S. L.J. (2007). The Use of Tourism Knowledge: Research Propositions. 
Annals of Tourism Research, 34 (2), 310-331. 
Zeithaml, V.A. & Bitner, M.J. (2003). Services Marketing: Integrating Customer Focus 
across the Firm, (3rd edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
21 
 
